Case Summaries

Attorney's Fees

[02/07] Secalt, S.A. v. Wuxi Shenxi Construction Machinery Co., Ltd.
In a suit claiming that the defendant's traction hoists infringed the trade dress of the plaintiffs' traction hoist, the district court’s grant of summary judgment, its finding of exceptionality, and its award of attorney’s fees under the Lanham Act are affirmed, where the plaintiffs did not present evidence sufficient to create a triable issue as to the nonfunctionality of its claimed trade dress, but the district court's award of non-taxable costs and certain taxable costs is reversed.

[02/02] Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC
In a suit alleging that a roommate-matching service website’s questions requiring disclosure of sex, sexual orientation and familial status, and its sorting, steering and matching of users based on those characteristics, violate the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), the district court's grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs, permanent injunction, and order awarding attorney's fees is: 1) vacated in part where plaintiffs had organizational standing; and 2) dismissed in part where the FHA and FEHA do not apply to the sharing of living units because precluding individuals from selecting roommates based on their sex, sexual orientation and familial status raises substantial constitutional concerns, and therefore the defendant's prompting, sorting and publishing of information to facilitate roommate selection is not forbidden by the FHA or FEHA.

[02/02] Lore v. City of Syracuse
In a case alleging illegal retaliation against a city police officer under Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law (HRL) because of her complaints of gender discrimination, the district court's judgment is: 1) affirmed in part where the city's arguments regarding the availability of reputation damages, evidentiary and instructional errors, and excessive damages for emotional distress presented no basis for disturbing the judgment; and 2) vacated in part where there was merit in plaintiff's contentions regarding the liability of the city's corporation counsel, and the district court erred in dismissing her principal gender discrimination claims under the HRL on the basis that she had suffered no materially adverse employment action.

[02/02] Lewow v. Surfside III Condominium Owners' Ass'n, Inc.
In a case in which judgment was entered in favor of a condominium association on a complaint for failure to perform its duties, against a plaintiff who subsequently filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the association is affirmed, where: 1) although the motion for fees was not timely filed, there was good cause for the delay, as it was understandable that the association was mistaken on the complex and debatable issue of whether the bankruptcy stay tolled the limitations period; and 2) although the trial court's articulated rationale for granting the fees was erroneous, its acceptance of the association's tolling argument was tantamount to a finding of good cause based on mistake.

[02/02] Marriage of Wahl
On appeal from an order requiring an ex-wife to pay to her former husband $552,153.28 in attorney's fees and costs as a sanction because of her conduct with respect to two post-dissolution orders, the order is affirmed, where the record disclosed no abuse of discretion in the trial court's award, and additional sanctions are imposed against the appellant and her appellate attorneys on a finding that the appeal is frivolous.

[01/26] Munoz v. Sociedad Espanola de Auxilio Mutuo y Beneficiencia de Puerto Rico
In a retaliation case under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) and Puerto Rico's general tort statute known as Article 1802, in which the jury found for the plaintiff, the district court's denial of the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for a new trial is affirmed, where: 1) the evidence presented at trial was enough to support the jury's finding of retaliation; 2) the appellants waived defenses based on the statute of limitations, the exclusive remedies bar, and a purportedly erroneous jury instruction; 3) the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find the requisite fault or negligence to sustain an Article 1802 claim; and 4) the awards of damages and attorney fees were proper.

[01/26] EEOC v. Great Steaks, Inc.
On a defendant's motion for attorney's fees after it had prevailed on a Title VII claim by the EEOC alleging sexual harassment of an employee, the district court's denial of the motion is affirmed, where the district court did not abuse its discretion in: 1) finding that the EEOC's case was not frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, and thus denying fees under Title VII's fee-shifting provision; 2) declining to award attorney's fees under EAJA, as EAJA's mandatory fee provision did not apply, given the availability of fees under Title VII; and 3) denying the motion for attorneys' fees and costs under 28 USC section 1927.

[01/25] US v. Moore
In a prosecution of a person for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 USC section 922(g)(1), the district court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss on Second Amendment grounds is affirmed, but its order that the defendant repay the incurred court-appointed attorneys' fees is vacated and remanded, where: 1) the statute was constitutional as applied to the defendant; and 2) on the record before the Fourth Circuit, the district court erred by failing to make the mandatory statutory findings that funds were available to the defendant for repayment as required to order reimbursement under the Criminal Justice Act.

[01/19] Washington State Republican Party v. Washington State Grange
In a suit involving the State of Washington's "top-two" primary election system, the district court's order granting the state's request for reimbursement of attorney's fees is reversed, and its summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff's claims in other respects is affirmed, where: 1) the state showed that its primary system furthered an important regulatory interest in providing voters with relevant information about the candidates on the ballots, so as to defeat the plaintiffs' as-applied freedom of association claims; 2) the state's primary system did not violate its fundamental right of access to the ballot by making it difficult for a minor-party candidates to qualify for the general election ballot; 3) a plaintiff did not explain how the state infringed its trademark in connection with the provision of competing services; 4) a written settlement definitively resolved the state's liability for attorney's fees; 5) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint to add a new claim; 6) the plaintiffs waived a claim concerning compelled speech because it was not included in any complaint; and 7) the primary system was severable from an unconstitutional provision of the same enacting legislation.

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Banking Law

[02/06] Duran v. U.S. Bank NA
In a wage and hour class action brought by current and former business banking officers who claimed they were misclassified by the defendant bank as outside sales personnel exempt from California's overtime laws, and were thus unlawfully denied overtime pay, the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs is reversed, where: 1) the trial plan erroneously relied on representative sampling and thus violated the bank's right to due process of law; 2) the trial court's refusal to allow the bank to introduce evidence to challenge the claims of certain class members violated its due process rights; 3) the statistical sampling methods, with their 43.3 percent margin of error, produced results so unreliable as to render the judgment unconstitutional; and 4) the trial court erred in denying a motion to decertify the class.

[02/01] GECCMC 2005-C1 Plummer Street Office L.P. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
In a suit alleging breach of lease agreements that the defendant bank assumed after it purchased a failed bank's assets and liabilities from the FDIC pursuant to the terms of a written purchase and assumption agreement, the district court's grant of the bank's motion to dismiss is affirmed, where under federal common law, the plaintiff lacked standing to bring suit under the agreement because it was not an intended third-party beneficiary of the agreement.

[01/24] TIFD III-E, Inc. v. US
In a suit by a taxpayer partner challenging IRS notices of adjustment reallocating a large percentage of the partnership's income for the years 1993 to 1998 to the taxpayer away from two Dutch banks that had purchased an interest in the partnership, and imposing a penalty for underpayment, the district court's judgment in favor of the taxpayer is reversed, where: 1) the banks' interest was not a capital interest for purposes of qualifying them as partners within the meaning of IRC section 704(e)(1); and 2) the taxpayer failed to point to substantial authority supporting its position, so that the government was entitled to impose a penalty on the taxpayer for substantial understatement of income.

[01/20] CRM Collateral II, Inc. v. TriCounty Metropolitan Transportation Dist. of Oregon
In proceedings following default on a standby letter of credit, the district court's disposition of the case on cross-motions for summary judgment is reversed and the case remanded, where: 1) the district court incorrectly concluded that the applicant for the letter of credit was a surety and erroneously permitted it to assert the defense of discharge; and 2) the applicant was not entitled to an award of damages because the beneficiary's draw on the letter of credit did not violate the statutory warranty to the applicant that the drawing did not violate any agreement between the applicant and the beneficiary.

[01/06] Vegas Diamond Properties, LLC v. FDIC
In an appeal from a judgment of the district court dissolving a Temporary Restraining Order on the ground that the anti-injunction provision of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act precluded it from enjoining the FDIC from conducting a trustee's sale of certain real properties, appeal is dismissed as moot where the subject properties were sold prior to appeal.

[12/29] Balderas v. Countrywide Bank, NA
In an appeal from a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the plaintiffs' Truth In Lending Act complaint, judgment is reversed where the complaint contained allegations that, if proven, presents a winning case, and thus the district court erred in dismissing the action however remote plaintiffs' ultimate success may be.

[12/23] Macpherson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
In a case in which an individual asserted state common law claims against a bank for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress stemming from the bank's alleged willful and malicious provision of false information about his finances to a consumer credit reporting agency, the district court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is affirmed, as the Fair Credit Reporting Act preempts the state law claims.

[12/21] Fayroyan-Mezhlumyan v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA
In an appeal from a judgment of the trial court dismissing, in part and as time-barred, plaintiff's complaint for payments of forged checks against her home equity line of credit by defendant-bank, judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part where the one-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 340(c) is not applicable because plaintiff is not a "depositor" within the meaning of Section 340(c).

[12/19] Amidax Trading Group v. S.W.I.F.T. SCRL
District court judgment dismissing complaint by seller of household cleaning products against government officials and a provider of electronic instructions on how to transfer money among financial institutions, and the court's order denying the seller's postjudgment motion for reconsideration, are affirmed where: 1) the seller did not have Article III standing to assert its claims because the seller failed to allege a plausible injury in fact; 2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying jurisdictional discovery; and 3) it would be futile to allow the seller to amend its complaint.

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Civil Procedure

[02/07] Diaz v. Jiten Hotel Management, Inc.
In an age discrimination action against an employer, the district court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff is affirmed, where: 1) there was no error in the district court's decision to issue a mixed-motive jury instruction; 2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to certify the mixed-motive question to the state court; and 3) even if the district court erred by omitting a statute of limitations jury instruction, that error was not prejudicial.

[02/07] Harrington v. Aggregate Industries - Northeast Region, Inc.
In a case under the False Claims Act (FCA)'s anti-retaliation provision, summary judgment in favor of the defendant is reversed, where: 1) the FCA's anti-retaliation provision is amenable to the use of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework; 2) the plaintiff demonstrated a prima facie case of retaliation; 3) there was a trialworthy issue about whether the defendant's proffered reason for firing the plaintiff was a sham; and 4) a release of claims did not bar the action because the plaintiff was not terminated until after the release was signed.

[02/07] Perry v. Brown
In a challenge to Proposition 8, a California ballot initiative approved by the voters amending the state constitution to eliminate the right of same-sex couples to marry, the district court's judgment invalidating the initiative is affirmed, with the following rulings: 1) the proponents of Proposition 8 had standing to bring the appeal on behalf of the State of California, whose people must be allowed to defend in federal courts the validity of their use of the initiative power; 2) however, Proposition 8 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution, as the people may not employ the initiative power to single out a disfavored group for unequal treatment and strip them, without a legitimate justification, of a right as important as the right to marry; and 3) the district court properly denied a motion to vacate the judgment, as the trial judge, who had been in a same-sex relationship for ten years, had no obligation to recuse himself or to disclose any personal conflict.

[02/07] Adair v. Carter
On appeal a decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences holding that the appellants' single claim involved in an interference with the appellees was time-barred under 35 USC section 135(b)(1), the decision of the Board is affirmed, where: 1) to overcome a section 135(b) bar for a post-critical date claim, an applicant must show that such claim is not materially different from a pre-critical date claim present in the application or any predecessor thereto in order to obtain the benefit of the earlier filing date, and in this case the Board found material differences; 2) the Board properly presumed material differences between the plaintiffs' post- and pre-critical date claims; 3) the Board did not establish any absolute requirement that the pre-critical date claims must have been patentable to the plaintiff, and doing so would have been harmless error; and 4) the Board did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider a claim for the first time on rehearing.

[02/07] Tri-Valley CAREs v. Dep't of Energy
In a challenge to the sufficiency of the United States Department of Energy's (DOE) environmental assessment of a prospective "biosafety level-3" facility at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the district court's summary judgment in favor of the DOE is affirmed, where: 1) the DOE took the requisite "hard look" at the environmental impact of an intentional terrorist attack; and 2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion to supplement the record.

[02/06] Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. US
In a suit brought by the former operator of a resort facility on federal land, seeking compensation from the United States for facilities that were allegedly retained and used by the Bureau of Land Management or by the resort operator's successor, the Court of Federal Claims' dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim is affirmed, where: 1) the trial court erred in concluding that the issues were identical to those in another case, and thus issue preclusion did not apply; but 2) the United States did not require the retention of the facilities under Public Law 96-375, so they remained the property of the resort operator and were abandoned.

[02/02] Lore v. City of Syracuse
In a case alleging illegal retaliation against a city police officer under Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law (HRL) because of her complaints of gender discrimination, the district court's judgment is: 1) affirmed in part where the city's arguments regarding the availability of reputation damages, evidentiary and instructional errors, and excessive damages for emotional distress presented no basis for disturbing the judgment; and 2) vacated in part where there was merit in plaintiff's contentions regarding the liability of the city's corporation counsel, and the district court erred in dismissing her principal gender discrimination claims under the HRL on the basis that she had suffered no materially adverse employment action.

[02/02] Gentry v. Siegel
In bankruptcy proceedings in which former employees of the debtor filed claims for unpaid overtime wages, the district court's judgment affirming the bankruptcy court's denial of a Rule 9014 motion and its refusal to allow the claimants to pursue class actions is affirmed, where: 1) the bankruptcy court was within its discretion to rule that the bankruptcy process would provide a process superior to the class action process for resolving the claims of former employees; 2) notice of the bankruptcy process to the named claimants was not constitutionally deficient; and 3) with respect to unnamed claimants, the named claimants lacked standing to challenge the notice.

[02/02] Marcavage v. National Park Service
In an action by an abortion protester under 42 USC Section 1983 against the National Park Service, the United States Department of the Interior, and two Park Service rangers, alleging violations of the plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause based on his arrest, the district court's grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state claim is affirmed, where: 1) the rangers were entitled to qualified immunity from the First and Fourth Amendment claims; 2) the plaintiff's "class of one" theory of an equal protection violation failed because he was not in all relevant respects like the others who shared the sidewalk on which he was arrested; and 3) the plaintiff's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were properly dismissed as moot because of a change in Park Service regulations.

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Commercial Law

[02/01] In re American Express Merchants' Litigation
In a class action asserting Sherman Act claims, brought against a charge card issuer whose card acceptance agreement purported to preclude a merchant from bringing a class action lawsuit, the district court's grant of the defendant's motion to compel arbitration and dismissal of the case is reversed, where the cost of plaintiffs' individually arbitrating their dispute with the defendant would be prohibitive, effectively depriving them of the statutory protections of the antitrust laws, and thus the class action waiver in the arbitration provision was unenforceable.

[01/27] C9 Ventures v. SVC-West, L.P.
In a personal injury suit in which a lessor of helium-filled tanks used to inflate festive balloons cross-complained against the lessee to enforce an indemnification provision on the back of an unsigned invoice, the trial court's judgment in favor of the lessor and award of attorney fees to it is reversed, where: 1) the lessee did not manifest assent to the terms on the back of the unsigned invoice by course of dealing or course of performance, or under basic contract law; 2) the lessee did not sign the invoice or otherwise expressly agree to its terms; 3) an unsigned invoice itself is not a contract, and repeated delivery of a particular form does not make the form part of the parties' agreement; 4) payment of the invoice merely constituted the lessee's performance of the obligation under the oral contract to pay for the rental of the helium-filled tanks; and 5) assuming the transaction was a sale of goods covered by division 2 of the California Commercial Code, the indemnification provision was not an additional term of the contract under section 2207 of the Commercial Code.

[01/24] Long v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A. Inc.
In a putative class action against a men's clothing retailer alleging that its printing of “EXPIRY: 04/##” on a credit card receipt willfully violated the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA)'s prohibition against printing the expiration date of the a credit card upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale, the district court's grant of the defendant's motion to dismiss is affirmed, where: 1) FACTA prohibits a merchant from printing expiration date information on a receipt provided to the consumer, even if the year is redacted; but 2) the defendant's interpretation of FACTA, although erroneous, was at least objectively reasonable, and thus there was no "willful" violation that could support a claim.

[01/24] Mabey Bridge & Shore, Inc. v. Schoch
In a suit by a corporation engaged in the business of supplying temporary steel bridges for construction projects, seeking a declaration that the Pennsylvania Steel Products Procurement Act, as interpreted and enforced by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT), is unconstitutional, and requesting a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining PennDOT from prohibiting the use of the company's temporary bridges on its projects, the district court's grant of summary judgment against the company on all its claims is affirmed, where: 1) the state Steel Act was not preempted by the federal Buy America Act and related federal regulations; 2) the Steel Act is not unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause; 3) PennDOT's actions did not violate the Contract Clause; and 4) PennDOT's application of the Steel Act did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.

[01/20] Khan v. Dell Inc.
On a motion to compel arbitration brought by a defendant computer manufacturer in a case alleging design defects brought as a putative consumer class action by a purchaser, the district court's judgment denying the motion is vacated and the case remanded, where: 1) the arbitration agreement in the purchase contract did not indicate the parties' unambiguous intent not to arbitrate their disputes if the named arbitrator was unavailable; and 2) Section 5 of the Federal Arbitration Act requires a court to address such unavailability by appointing a substitute arbitrator.

[01/17] Antilles Cement Corp. v. Fortuno
In a suit by an importer of foreign cement seeking a declaratory judgment that two statutes of Puerto Rico violate the dormant foreign commerce clause, the district court's judgment invalidating the statutes is affirmed in part and reversed in part, where: 1) the federal Buy American Act does not preempt the statutes; 2) Puerto Rico, by its statute requiring that local construction projects financed with funds from the federal government or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico use only construction materials manufactured in Puerto Rico, is acting as a market participant not subject to the Commerce Clause; and 3) certain provisions of Puerto Rico's statute imposing labeling requirements on cement sold in Puerto Rico discriminate against sellers of foreign cement in violation of the dormant foreign commerce clause.

[01/05] American Express Travel Related Services, Inc. v. Sidamon-Eristoff
In an appeal from a judgment of the district court denying appellant's motion for a preliminary injunction, judgment is affirmed where appellant failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of its constitutional challenge to N.J. Laws Chapter 25, which amended New Jersey’s unclaimed property statute to reduce the abandonment period for travelers checks.

[12/30] Orthopedic Systems, Inc. v. Schlein
In cross-appeals from the judgment of the district court in action for tort and breach of contract and arising from the sale of a medical device called the "Schlein Shoulder Positioner," judgment is affirmed as modified where the trial court incorrectly excluded awarded-profits from the final judgment but properly denied plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

[12/20] Arrigotti Fine Jewelry v. DE Beers SA
In an appeal from the district court‘s certification of two nationwide settlement classes comprising purchasers of diamonds from De Beers S.A. and related entities, judgment is affirmed because when determining the propriety of a Rule 23 certification, a district court does not have ensure that each class member possesses a viable claim or some colorable legal claim.

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Construction

[02/07] Secalt, S.A. v. Wuxi Shenxi Construction Machinery Co., Ltd.
In a suit claiming that the defendant's traction hoists infringed the trade dress of the plaintiffs' traction hoist, the district court’s grant of summary judgment, its finding of exceptionality, and its award of attorney’s fees under the Lanham Act are affirmed, where the plaintiffs did not present evidence sufficient to create a triable issue as to the nonfunctionality of its claimed trade dress, but the district court's award of non-taxable costs and certain taxable costs is reversed.

[01/26] Tverberg v. Fillner Construction, Inc.
In a suit brought by a husband and wife based on injuries sustained after the husband, an independent contractor, was injured on a worksite on which the defendant was operating as the general contractor, judgment against the plaintiffs is reversed, where: 1) the trial court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on a breach of regulatory duty theory of recovery, as the defendant delegated its obligation to comply with Cal-OSHA workplace regulations to the plaintiff; but 2) the trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' retained control theory of direct liability, since the plaintiffs offered sufficient evidence of a triable issue on affirmative contribution.

[01/24] Mabey Bridge & Shore, Inc. v. Schoch
In a suit by a corporation engaged in the business of supplying temporary steel bridges for construction projects, seeking a declaration that the Pennsylvania Steel Products Procurement Act, as interpreted and enforced by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT), is unconstitutional, and requesting a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining PennDOT from prohibiting the use of the company's temporary bridges on its projects, the district court's grant of summary judgment against the company on all its claims is affirmed, where: 1) the state Steel Act was not preempted by the federal Buy America Act and related federal regulations; 2) the Steel Act is not unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause; 3) PennDOT's actions did not violate the Contract Clause; and 4) PennDOT's application of the Steel Act did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.

[01/23] Rossa v. D.L. Falk Construction, Inc.
In a suit in which a defendant sought to recover the interest it paid on the sums it borrowed to secure a bank’s letter of credit on an appeal bond, the court of appeal's judgment that the interest was not recoverable is affirmed, as California Rules of Court, rule 8.278(d)(1)(F) does not extend to interest expenses incurred to borrow funds to provide security for a letter of credit.

[01/20] CRM Collateral II, Inc. v. TriCounty Metropolitan Transportation Dist. of Oregon
In proceedings following default on a standby letter of credit, the district court's disposition of the case on cross-motions for summary judgment is reversed and the case remanded, where: 1) the district court incorrectly concluded that the applicant for the letter of credit was a surety and erroneously permitted it to assert the defense of discharge; and 2) the applicant was not entitled to an award of damages because the beneficiary's draw on the letter of credit did not violate the statutory warranty to the applicant that the drawing did not violate any agreement between the applicant and the beneficiary.

[01/17] Antilles Cement Corp. v. Fortuno
In a suit by an importer of foreign cement seeking a declaratory judgment that two statutes of Puerto Rico violate the dormant foreign commerce clause, the district court's judgment invalidating the statutes is affirmed in part and reversed in part, where: 1) the federal Buy American Act does not preempt the statutes; 2) Puerto Rico, by its statute requiring that local construction projects financed with funds from the federal government or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico use only construction materials manufactured in Puerto Rico, is acting as a market participant not subject to the Commerce Clause; and 3) certain provisions of Puerto Rico's statute imposing labeling requirements on cement sold in Puerto Rico discriminate against sellers of foreign cement in violation of the dormant foreign commerce clause.

[12/29] Northern Plains Resources Council, Inc v. The Surface Transportation Bd.
In a challenge to respondent-Transportation Board's approval of certain railroad construction applications, orders are: 1) reversed in part where the Board failed to take the requisite "hard look" at certain material environmental impacts inherent in two of the applications as required by NEPA; and 2) affirmed in part where the Board did not err in its public convenience and necessity analyses, except with respect to its reliance on the viability of a flawed, preceding application during the approval of a subsequent application.

[12/20] Ortiz v. Varsity Holdings, LLC
In an appeal from a judgment of the appellate division affirming a dismissal of plaintiff's Labor Law section 240(1) cause of action and the denial of his cross-motion on that claim, judgment is affirmed as modified where the trial court erred in finding that, as a matter of law, an equipment of the kind enumerated in Section 240 (1) was not necessary to guard plaintiff from the risk of injury.

[12/16] Beazer v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation
In an appeal from a judgment of the appellate division affirming the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's common law negligence claim, judgment is affirmed because there are unresolved factual issues concerning whether defendant owed any duty to plaintiff.

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Contracts

[02/01] GECCMC 2005-C1 Plummer Street Office L.P. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
In a suit alleging breach of lease agreements that the defendant bank assumed after it purchased a failed bank's assets and liabilities from the FDIC pursuant to the terms of a written purchase and assumption agreement, the district court's grant of the bank's motion to dismiss is affirmed, where under federal common law, the plaintiff lacked standing to bring suit under the agreement because it was not an intended third-party beneficiary of the agreement.

[01/27] C9 Ventures v. SVC-West, L.P.
In a personal injury suit in which a lessor of helium-filled tanks used to inflate festive balloons cross-complained against the lessee to enforce an indemnification provision on the back of an unsigned invoice, the trial court's judgment in favor of the lessor and award of attorney fees to it is reversed, where: 1) the lessee did not manifest assent to the terms on the back of the unsigned invoice by course of dealing or course of performance, or under basic contract law; 2) the lessee did not sign the invoice or otherwise expressly agree to its terms; 3) an unsigned invoice itself is not a contract, and repeated delivery of a particular form does not make the form part of the parties' agreement; 4) payment of the invoice merely constituted the lessee's performance of the obligation under the oral contract to pay for the rental of the helium-filled tanks; and 5) assuming the transaction was a sale of goods covered by division 2 of the California Commercial Code, the indemnification provision was not an additional term of the contract under section 2207 of the Commercial Code.

[01/26] Lopez & Medina Corp. v. Marsh USA, Inc.
On appeal of a rejected cross-motion for summary judgment that argued that an insurance policy's coverage expressly applied to an airline's underlying claims for damages arising from the insured's failure to provide air transportation, as contractually required, to the airline's passengers, the district court's order denying the motion is affirmed, as the phrase "legally obligated to pay as damages" in a commercial general liability policy, which usually covers only tort claims, does not also provide coverage for claims in an underlying action arising out of and related to a contract between the parties.

[01/25] Klein v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
In a class action complaint predicated on the defendant's practice of purchasing wholesale motor fuel in gallon units at a standardized temperature of 60 degrees Fahrenheit, but selling motor fuel to California consumers at an average temperature of approximately 70 degrees, the trial court's order granting the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is reversed, and its order sustaining the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment and unlawful business practices under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) is affirmed in part and reversed in part, where: 1) the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' UCL and Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) claims pursuant to the judicial abstention doctrine; 2) the plaintiffs had standing to assert, and the complaint stated a cause of action for, violation of the UCL and CLRA; 3) the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for breach of contract; and 4) the trial court did not err in sustaining the defendant’s demurrer to the plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim.

[01/24] In the Matter of Thorpe Insulation Co.
In a bankruptcy case in which several insurance companies that did not reach settlements with the debtors were not allowed to challenge the Chapter 11 reorganization plan, the district court order issuing and affirming the plan is reversed with instructions on remand, where: 1) the appeal was not equitably moot; 2) the appellants met statutory, constitutional, and prudential standing requirements; 3) the appellants had standing in bankruptcy court to object to confirmation of the plan; and 4) anti-assignment provisions contained in contracts between the appellants and debtors were preempted by federal bankruptcy law.

[01/20] CRM Collateral II, Inc. v. TriCounty Metropolitan Transportation Dist. of Oregon
In proceedings following default on a standby letter of credit, the district court's disposition of the case on cross-motions for summary judgment is reversed and the case remanded, where: 1) the district court incorrectly concluded that the applicant for the letter of credit was a surety and erroneously permitted it to assert the defense of discharge; and 2) the applicant was not entitled to an award of damages because the beneficiary's draw on the letter of credit did not violate the statutory warranty to the applicant that the drawing did not violate any agreement between the applicant and the beneficiary.

[01/20] Khan v. Dell Inc.
On a motion to compel arbitration brought by a defendant computer manufacturer in a case alleging design defects brought as a putative consumer class action by a purchaser, the district court's judgment denying the motion is vacated and the case remanded, where: 1) the arbitration agreement in the purchase contract did not indicate the parties' unambiguous intent not to arbitrate their disputes if the named arbitrator was unavailable; and 2) Section 5 of the Federal Arbitration Act requires a court to address such unavailability by appointing a substitute arbitrator.

[01/19] Washington State Republican Party v. Washington State Grange
In a suit involving the State of Washington's "top-two" primary election system, the district court's order granting the state's request for reimbursement of attorney's fees is reversed, and its summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff's claims in other respects is affirmed, where: 1) the state showed that its primary system furthered an important regulatory interest in providing voters with relevant information about the candidates on the ballots, so as to defeat the plaintiffs' as-applied freedom of association claims; 2) the state's primary system did not violate its fundamental right of access to the ballot by making it difficult for a minor-party candidates to qualify for the general election ballot; 3) a plaintiff did not explain how the state infringed its trademark in connection with the provision of competing services; 4) a written settlement definitively resolved the state's liability for attorney's fees; 5) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint to add a new claim; 6) the plaintiffs waived a claim concerning compelled speech because it was not included in any complaint; and 7) the primary system was severable from an unconstitutional provision of the same enacting legislation.

[01/19] System Fuels, Inc. v. US
In a case in which the United States Court of Federal Claims determined that the United States breached a contract for the removal of spent nuclear fuel, the damages award is affirmed in part and reversed in part, where: 1) the trial court properly denied the cost of borrowed funds to construct the plaintiffs' dry fuel storage facility, as interest and interest costs incurred on money borrowed as a result of the government's breach or delay in payment are not recoverable; 2) the trial court erred in granting an offset of damages for certain overhead costs; and 3) the trial court did not err in its causation analysis and determination of the amount of nominal damages.

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Copyright

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Criminal Law & Procedure

[02/07] Farmer v. McDaniel
On petition for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge a death sentence that Nevada sought to reimpose on the basis of statutory aggravating circumstances different from those used in imposing an earlier invalid death sentence, the district court's denial of the petition is affirmed, as the state’s renewed attempt to seek a death sentence on grounds present in the defendant's first sentencing is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

[02/06] People v. Murray
In a prosecution of a 17-year-old for first degree murder and attempted murder that resulted in conviction and a sentence of life without parole, the judgment is affirmed as modified, where: 1) life-without-parole sentences are not categorically barred by the Eighth Amendment or article I, section 17 of the California Constitution; 2) the sentence was not unconstitutionally disproportionate when the nature of the crimes was measured against various mitigating circumstances; and 3) the trial court did not abuse its sentencing discretion or violate the defendant's due process rights when it sentenced him.

[02/06] US v. Reyes-Bonilla
In a prosecution for being a deported alien found in the United States without permission, the conviction is affirmed, where: 1) the defendant was deprived of the opportunity for judicial review of his prior removal order, and was exempt from the administrative-remedies exhaustion requirement because did not validly waive his right of appeal; and 2) the defendant was not properly advised of his due process right to counsel nor did he waive this right; but 3) this due process violation was not per se prejudicial; and 4) the defendant could not demonstrate that he had a plausible claim to relief at the time of removal proceedings, so he was not actually prejudiced as a result of the due process violations, and entry of the removal order was not fundamentally unfair.

[02/06] Richardson v. Branker
On a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC section 2254, the district court's judgment is: 1) reversed, insofar as it granted the petition, where the district court erred in considering the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under a de novo standard of review, and the state court did not hold unreasonably that the petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland; and 2) affirmed, insofar as it awarded summary judgment against the petitioner on his claims that the state withheld exculpatory evidence from him before trial, and that because he was mentally retarded, his sentence of death violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.

[02/06] People v. Enraca
On automatic appeal of a death sentence upon conviction of first-degree murder and other crimes, the judgment is affirmed against numerous challenges, including those involving the admissibility of the defendant's confession, the refusal of the defendant's request to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter due to heat of passion, jury instructions on perfect and imperfect self-defense, the failure of the court to advise the defendant of his right to testify or obtain an on-the-record waiver of that right, the failure of the court to give a limiting instruction, sua sponte, regarding the use of victim impact evidence, allegedly improper prosecutorial argument, lack of remorse as an aggravating circumstance, a refusal to instruct during the penalty phase on lingering doubt, and the Death Penalty Law and sentencing instructions.

[02/03] US v. Mahin
In a prosecution on two counts of possessing a firearm or ammunition while subject to a domestic violence protective order in violation of 18 USC section 922(g)(8), the judgment of conviction is: 1) affirmed in part, where the statute and its application to the defendant's firearm use the same day he was served with a protective order did not violate the Second Amendment under the intermediate scrutiny standard; and 2) reversed in part and remanded for resentencing, where it was plain error to convict and sentence the defendant on two separate counts for the simultaneous possession of a firearm and ammunition under section 922(g)(8).

[02/03] US v. Culbertson
In a prosecution in which the defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiracy to import 100 grams or more of heroin and five kilograms or more of cocaine, the case is remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate the judgment of conviction, where: 1) there was an inadequate factual basis for the defendant's guilty plea with respect to the quantity of drugs for which he was responsible; and 2) the district court's error in accepting the defendant's plea was not harmless.

[02/03] People v. Gabriel
On appeal from conviction on charges of cultivation and possession of marijuana and other offenses, the judgment is affirmed, where: 1) the trial court did not err in allowing the prosecution to impeach the defendant's credibility with evidence of his prior convictions for possession of an assault weapon and cultivation of marijuana, inasmuch as each of those offenses is a crime involving moral turpitude; and 2) any error in admitting the prior convictions evidence would have been harmless error, as it would not have resulted in prejudice requiring reversal.

[02/03] US v. Leahy
In a sentencing challenge brought by a defendant convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, the district court's 10-year sentence is affirmed, where: 1) the district court's application of enhancements under the sentencing guidelines and its inclusion of criminal history points was procedurally reasonable; and 2) the sentence, although the maximum possible, was substantively reasonable, as the district court articulated a plausible sentencing rationale and imposed a sentence within the range of reasonable outcomes.

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Ethics & Disciplinary

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Evidence

[02/07] Tri-Valley CAREs v. Dep't of Energy
In a challenge to the sufficiency of the United States Department of Energy's (DOE) environmental assessment of a prospective "biosafety level-3" facility at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the district court's summary judgment in favor of the DOE is affirmed, where: 1) the DOE took the requisite "hard look" at the environmental impact of an intentional terrorist attack; and 2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion to supplement the record.

[02/06] Richardson v. Branker
On a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC section 2254, the district court's judgment is: 1) reversed, insofar as it granted the petition, where the district court erred in considering the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under a de novo standard of review, and the state court did not hold unreasonably that the petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland; and 2) affirmed, insofar as it awarded summary judgment against the petitioner on his claims that the state withheld exculpatory evidence from him before trial, and that because he was mentally retarded, his sentence of death violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.

[02/06] People v. Enraca
On automatic appeal of a death sentence upon conviction of first-degree murder and other crimes, the judgment is affirmed against numerous challenges, including those involving the admissibility of the defendant's confession, the refusal of the defendant's request to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter due to heat of passion, jury instructions on perfect and imperfect self-defense, the failure of the court to advise the defendant of his right to testify or obtain an on-the-record waiver of that right, the failure of the court to give a limiting instruction, sua sponte, regarding the use of victim impact evidence, allegedly improper prosecutorial argument, lack of remorse as an aggravating circumstance, a refusal to instruct during the penalty phase on lingering doubt, and the Death Penalty Law and sentencing instructions.

[02/06] Duran v. U.S. Bank NA
In a wage and hour class action brought by current and former business banking officers who claimed they were misclassified by the defendant bank as outside sales personnel exempt from California's overtime laws, and were thus unlawfully denied overtime pay, the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs is reversed, where: 1) the trial plan erroneously relied on representative sampling and thus violated the bank's right to due process of law; 2) the trial court's refusal to allow the bank to introduce evidence to challenge the claims of certain class members violated its due process rights; 3) the statistical sampling methods, with their 43.3 percent margin of error, produced results so unreliable as to render the judgment unconstitutional; and 4) the trial court erred in denying a motion to decertify the class.

[02/03] People v. Gabriel
On appeal from conviction on charges of cultivation and possession of marijuana and other offenses, the judgment is affirmed, where: 1) the trial court did not err in allowing the prosecution to impeach the defendant's credibility with evidence of his prior convictions for possession of an assault weapon and cultivation of marijuana, inasmuch as each of those offenses is a crime involving moral turpitude; and 2) any error in admitting the prior convictions evidence would have been harmless error, as it would not have resulted in prejudice requiring reversal.

[02/02] Lore v. City of Syracuse
In a case alleging illegal retaliation against a city police officer under Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law (HRL) because of her complaints of gender discrimination, the district court's judgment is: 1) affirmed in part where the city's arguments regarding the availability of reputation damages, evidentiary and instructional errors, and excessive damages for emotional distress presented no basis for disturbing the judgment; and 2) vacated in part where there was merit in plaintiff's contentions regarding the liability of the city's corporation counsel, and the district court erred in dismissing her principal gender discrimination claims under the HRL on the basis that she had suffered no materially adverse employment action.

[02/02] People v. Brents
In a prosecution for first-degree murder and other crimes which resulted in a conviction and death sentence, the judgment is reversed as to the sentence of death, and the jury's true finding on the kidnapping special circumstance allegation is stricken, where the jury was not properly instructed regarding the need to find an independent felonious purpose to kidnap the victim, but the convictions are otherwise upheld where: 1) hearsay statements were admissible under Evidence Code section 791(b) as prior consistent statements; 2) there was no abuse of discretion in the admission of a photograph of the victim's body; 3) the trial court did not violate Penal Code section 654's prohibition against multiple sentences for a single act or course of conduct by imposing a death sentence for the murder conviction and a consecutive 25-years-to-life term for the felony assault conviction; and 4) the trial court did not make multiple errors, so that the defendant's claim of cumulative prejudice necessarily failed.

[02/02] People v. Elliott
On appeal of the death sentence after conviction for crimes including first-degree murder with the special circumstance of murder during the commission of a robbery, the sentence is affirmed against numerous and various challenges on issues relating to: 1) pretrial procedures and jury selection; 2) the defendant's guilt; 3) the penalty imposed; and 4) the adequacy of the appellate record.

[02/01] US v. Noriega-Perez
In a prosecution of a property owner stemming from his renting houses he owned near the United States-Mexico border to an alien smuggling organization knowing that they would be used as load houses to conceal and later transfer recently arrived aliens, the convictions are affirmed, where: 1) the strong circumstantial evidence presented at trial sufficed for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that non-testifying material witnesses were illegal aliens; 2) a reasonable jury could find sufficient specific evidence linking the defendant to intentionally aiding the cross-border transportation of the named material witnesses before they were dropped off in the United States.

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Injury & Tort Law

[02/03] Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Roberts
In a suit brought by an insurer seeking a declaratory judgment that it was required to indemnify its insured for no more than 40 percent of a state court judgment because it had covered its insured for no more than 40 percent of the time in which the state court plaintiff was exposed to lead poisoning, the district court's judgment is: 1) affirmed in part, where it was correct in allocating the insurer's liability using the pro-rata time on-the-risk, and its decision to use the plaintiff's date of birth as the starting point for the period in which she was exposed to lead poisoning was sound; and 2) reversed in part, where the district court erred in holding the insurer liable for 24 months of coverage rather than 22, since under the insurance contract, coverage ended when the property was sold.

[02/02] Lore v. City of Syracuse
In a case alleging illegal retaliation against a city police officer under Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law (HRL) because of her complaints of gender discrimination, the district court's judgment is: 1) affirmed in part where the city's arguments regarding the availability of reputation damages, evidentiary and instructional errors, and excessive damages for emotional distress presented no basis for disturbing the judgment; and 2) vacated in part where there was merit in plaintiff's contentions regarding the liability of the city's corporation counsel, and the district court erred in dismissing her principal gender discrimination claims under the HRL on the basis that she had suffered no materially adverse employment action.

[02/01] Maxton v. Western States Metals
In a suit alleging negligence and strict liability causes of action based on personal injuries as a result of working with metal products manufactured by the defendants and supplied to the plaintiff's employer, the district court's judgment in favor of the defendants on demurrers is affirmed, where: 1) the metal products involved were not inherently dangerous, and no other circumstances justified imposing liability on the defendants for the plaintiff's injuries under the component parts doctrine; 2) the plaintiff did not meet his burden of showing there was a reasonable possibility that the deficiencies in the complaint could be cured by amendment.

[01/30] Sennett v. US
In a suit by a photojournalist seeking money damages against the federal government for FBI agents' alleged violations of the Privacy Protection Act (PPA) stemming from a search of her apartment, the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the United States is affirmed, where: 1) the facts as alleged showed that the officers had probable cause to believe that the plaintiff was involved in criminal activity; and 2) the search of her home related to the investigation of that activity, so that the "suspect exception" to the PPA applied.

[01/27] AE v. County of Tulare
In a suit arising from the sexual assault of a minor by his foster brother, alleging against the county that ran the foster home a claim under 42 USC section 1983 for deliberate indifference and claims for negligence pursuant to California statutes, the district court's dismissal of all claims against the county is reversed, where: 1) the district court abused its discretion when it denied leave to amend the complaint to cure defects in the section 1983 claim; 2) the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the derivative liability claims against the county with prejudice and without leave to amend when it granted leave to amend as to the allegations regarding defendant county social workers.

[01/27] C9 Ventures v. SVC-West, L.P.
In a personal injury suit in which a lessor of helium-filled tanks used to inflate festive balloons cross-complained against the lessee to enforce an indemnification provision on the back of an unsigned invoice, the trial court's judgment in favor of the lessor and award of attorney fees to it is reversed, where: 1) the lessee did not manifest assent to the terms on the back of the unsigned invoice by course of dealing or course of performance, or under basic contract law; 2) the lessee did not sign the invoice or otherwise expressly agree to its terms; 3) an unsigned invoice itself is not a contract, and repeated delivery of a particular form does not make the form part of the parties' agreement; 4) payment of the invoice merely constituted the lessee's performance of the obligation under the oral contract to pay for the rental of the helium-filled tanks; and 5) assuming the transaction was a sale of goods covered by division 2 of the California Commercial Code, the indemnification provision was not an additional term of the contract under section 2207 of the Commercial Code.

[01/26] Munoz v. Sociedad Espanola de Auxilio Mutuo y Beneficiencia de Puerto Rico
In a retaliation case under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) and Puerto Rico's general tort statute known as Article 1802, in which the jury found for the plaintiff, the district court's denial of the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for a new trial is affirmed, where: 1) the evidence presented at trial was enough to support the jury's finding of retaliation; 2) the appellants waived defenses based on the statute of limitations, the exclusive remedies bar, and a purportedly erroneous jury instruction; 3) the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find the requisite fault or negligence to sustain an Article 1802 claim; and 4) the awards of damages and attorney fees were proper.

[01/26] Allstate Property and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Squires
In an action by an insurance company seeking a declaratory judgment that it was not obligated to pay uninsured motorist benefits to a policyholder, the district court's order granting the insurer's motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing counterclaims is reversed, where in light of the insurer's concession for purposes of its motion that the accident giving rise to the claim was caused by a box dropped from an unidentified vehicle, the accident arose out of the maintenance, ownership, or use of an uninsured vehicle, so that it was covered under the insurance policy.

[01/26] Tverberg v. Fillner Construction, Inc.
In a suit brought by a husband and wife based on injuries sustained after the husband, an independent contractor, was injured on a worksite on which the defendant was operating as the general contractor, judgment against the plaintiffs is reversed, where: 1) the trial court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on a breach of regulatory duty theory of recovery, as the defendant delegated its obligation to comply with Cal-OSHA workplace regulations to the plaintiff; but 2) the trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' retained control theory of direct liability, since the plaintiffs offered sufficient evidence of a triable issue on affirmative contribution.

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Intellectual Property

[02/07] Adair v. Carter
On appeal a decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences holding that the appellants' single claim involved in an interference with the appellees was time-barred under 35 USC section 135(b)(1), the decision of the Board is affirmed, where: 1) to overcome a section 135(b) bar for a post-critical date claim, an applicant must show that such claim is not materially different from a pre-critical date claim present in the application or any predecessor thereto in order to obtain the benefit of the earlier filing date, and in this case the Board found material differences; 2) the Board properly presumed material differences between the plaintiffs' post- and pre-critical date claims; 3) the Board did not establish any absolute requirement that the pre-critical date claims must have been patentable to the plaintiff, and doing so would have been harmless error; and 4) the Board did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider a claim for the first time on rehearing.

[02/07] Secalt, S.A. v. Wuxi Shenxi Construction Machinery Co., Ltd.
In a suit claiming that the defendant's traction hoists infringed the trade dress of the plaintiffs' traction hoist, the district court’s grant of summary judgment, its finding of exceptionality, and its award of attorney’s fees under the Lanham Act are affirmed, where the plaintiffs did not present evidence sufficient to create a triable issue as to the nonfunctionality of its claimed trade dress, but the district court's award of non-taxable costs and certain taxable costs is reversed.

[02/01] Thorner v. Sony Computer Entertainment America LLC
In a patent infringement action concerning a patent relating to a tactile feedback system for computer video games, the district court's judgment of noninfringement upon stipulation is vacated and the case remanded, where: 1) the district court improperly limited the term "attached to said pad" to mean attachment only to an external surface, and the parties based the stipulation of noninfringement on the district court's erroneous construction of this claim; and 2) the district court erred in its construction of the term "flexible."

[01/27] Krippelz v. Ford Motor Co.
In a patent infringement case involving a vehicle-mounted lamp, the district court's denial of the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law on invalidity is reversed, its summary judgment of infringement is vacated, and the case is remanded for entry of judgment of nonliability for the defendant, where the district court committed reversible error in its holdings that: 1) a reasonable jury could find that a competing French patent failed to teach the required "conical beam of light;" and 2) the jury could have reasonably found the French patent to lack a lamp "adjacent to the window."

[01/23] Falana v. Kent State University
In a suit against a university and inventors listed on a patent alleging that the plaintiff was an omitted co-inventor, the district court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiff as to inventorship is affirmed, where: 1) the district court did not err in construing the language of the claims; 2) error in the exclusion of certain exhibits did not result in substantial injustice and was harmless error; 3) the district court did not err in concluding that the plaintiff's contribution of the method used by the team of which he was a part for making the claimed compounds was enough of a contribution to conception to pass the threshold required for joint inventorship; and 4) the district court's exceptional case finding and award of attorney fees were not yet final and not properly before the court of appeals.

[01/20] Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber
In a patent infringement action involving patents directed to a computer-aided method and system for processing credit applications over electronic networks, the district court's rulings on summary judgment motions are affirmed in part, vacated in part, reversed in part, and the case remanded, where: 1) the district court erred in granting summary judgment of noninfringement based on a construction of "communications medium" that carved out the Internet; 2) the court modified the claim constructions of "communications medium" and "central processing means," requiring it to vacate summary judgment of noninfringement and remand to the district court to determine infringement in the first instance applying the new constructions; 3) the district court legally erred in denying a motion for summary judgment of invalidity of certain claims for indefiniteness; 4) the district court correctly found that certain claims were patent ineligible abstract ideas.

[01/19] Washington State Republican Party v. Washington State Grange
In a suit involving the State of Washington's "top-two" primary election system, the district court's order granting the state's request for reimbursement of attorney's fees is reversed, and its summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff's claims in other respects is affirmed, where: 1) the state showed that its primary system furthered an important regulatory interest in providing voters with relevant information about the candidates on the ballots, so as to defeat the plaintiffs' as-applied freedom of association claims; 2) the state's primary system did not violate its fundamental right of access to the ballot by making it difficult for a minor-party candidates to qualify for the general election ballot; 3) a plaintiff did not explain how the state infringed its trademark in connection with the provision of competing services; 4) a written settlement definitively resolved the state's liability for attorney's fees; 5) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint to add a new claim; 6) the plaintiffs waived a claim concerning compelled speech because it was not included in any complaint; and 7) the primary system was severable from an unconstitutional provision of the same enacting legislation.

[01/18] Golan v. Holder
In a suit by orchestra conductors, musicians, publishers, and others who formerly enjoyed free access to literary and artistic works removed from the public domain by section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, the Tenth Circuit's reversal of a grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs is affirmed, as: 1) section 514 does not exceed Congress’s authority under the Copyright Clause; and 2) the First Amendment does not inhibit the restoration of foreign works to copyright protection by section 514.

[01/13] Abbott Point of Care Inc. v. Epocal, Inc.
The district court's dismissal of a patent infringement suit for lack of standing is affirmed, where: 1) contracts between the plaintiff's predecessors and the defendant did not assign the patents to the plaintiff; and 2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying jurisdictional discovery.

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Legal Malpractice

[05/05] In Re: Teligent, Incorporated
In a dispute arising from an action for legal malpractice, judgment of the district court denying motion to lift bankruptcy protective orders and cross-motion for injunctive relief barring defendant from attacking the validity of a settlement agreement on the grounds of waiver is affirmed where: 1) defendant-law firm failed to make the requisite showing to lift orders; and 2) it was not a party in interest with standing such that its failure to contest the validity of settlement agreement constituted waiver.

[04/19] Callahan v. Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher
In a dispute alleging professional malpractice arising from the drafting of a deficient partnership agreement by the defendant, summary judgment on the ground that action was time-barred is reversed because placement of actual injury upon the execution of the defective agreement was erroneous where CCP section 340.6 (a)(1), tolled the limitations period until plaintiff could establish a cause of action for legal malpractice.

[04/13] Knopick v. Connelly
In a dispute arising from a legal malpractice claim and the timeliness of underlying tort action, summary judgment in favor of defendant on the ground that action was time-barred is reversed where district court failed to apply the discovery rule to underlying claim, and there was a genuine issue of fact prohibiting summary dismissal.

[03/04] Augusta v. Keehn and Associates
In a civil action alleging legal malpractice, order denying petition by plaintiff to compel arbitration of action is affirmed, as it is supported by substantial evidence.

[01/13] Cassel v. Superior Court
In plaintiff's malpractice action against his attorneys, claiming that by bad advice, deception, and coercion, the attorneys, who has a conflict of interest, induced him to settle for a lower amount than he had told them he would accept in the underlying action, the court of appeals' judgment vacating the trial court's grant of defendant attorneys motion to exclude all evidence of private attorney-client discussions immediately preceding, and during, the mediation concerning mediation settlement strategies and defendants' efforts to persuade plaintiff to reach a settlement in the mediation, is reversed where: 1) the result reached by the court of appeals contravenes the Legislature's explicit command that, unless the confidentiality of a particular communicative is expressly waived, under statutory procedures, by all mediation "participants," or at least by all those "participants" by or for whom it was prepared, things said or written for the purpose of and pursuant to a mediation shall be inadmissible in any civil action; 2) as the statutes make clear, confidentiality, unless waived, extends beyond utterances or writings in the course of a mediation, and thus is not confined to communications that occur between mediation disputants during the mediation proceeding itself, and by holding otherwise, and overturning the trial court's exclusionary order, the court of appeal erred.

[01/11] Warrior Sports, Inc. v. Dickinson Wright, P.L.L.C.
In a patent owner's malpractice action against a law firm, arising from an underlying patent infringement litigation involving patents directed to lacrosse sticks and heads, district court's dismissal of the suit for lack of jurisdiction is vacated and remanded as, because at least one of plaintiff's malpractice claims requires the court to resolve a substantive issue of patent law, 28 U.S.C. section 1338, which grants district courts exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under a statute relating to patents, invests the district court with subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims in this case.

[12/08] Hall v. Kalfayan
In plaintiff's suit for legal malpractice, claiming that the attorney's failure to timely perform his duties had deprived him of the majority of a testator's estate, trial court's grant of the attorney's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the attorney owed no duty to plaintiff, who was not his client and not the beneficiary of an executed estate plan, is affirmed as a prospective beneficiary of a will cannot maintain a cause of action for legal malpractice against the attorney who drafted the will but did not have it executed before the death of the testator.

[11/30] Dang v. Smith
In plaintiff's legal malpractice action against her former attorneys and their firm, who had represented plaintiff in obtaining and attempting to collect a judgment against two men who purchased a bakery business from her and then defaulted, claiming that defendants failed to record a judgment lien against real property in which one of the judgment debtors held an interest as joint tenant, trial court's grant of defendants' motion for summary judgment is affirmed as plaintiff made no attempt to demonstrate, by proposed pleading, declarations, or otherwise, that she could truthfully plead, let alone prove, the elements of a cause of action on any of her new three theories. Further, because plaintiff at no time moved, or even asked the court, for leave to amend her complaint, plaintiff's argument that the trial court erred by failing to grant leave to amend is rejected not only because it is procedurally insupportable, but because none of the proposed new theories appears to be substantively viable.

[08/26] Florida Bar v. Hall
In an attorney's disciplinary proceedings, arising from forgery and fraudulent recording of a lease agreement and agreement for sale between the attorney and property owners, a referee's recommendation of a ninety-day suspension is approved in part and disapproved in part where: 1) referee's finding of fact, recommendations of guilt, and award of costs are affirmed; 2) referee's reliance on Standard 7.0 is disapproved and instead Standard 5.0 should be applied; and 3) referee's recommendation of a ninety-day suspension is unsupported, as after considering the factual findings, the totality of misconduct, case law, and the Standards, disbarment is the appropriate sanction.

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Patent

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Trade Dress

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Trade Secrets

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Trademark

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